Random perturbation is a popular method of computing anonymized data for privacy preserving data mining. It is simple to apply, ensures strong privacy protection, and permits effective mining of a large variety of data patterns. However, all the existing studies with good privacy guarantees focus on perturbation at a single privacy level. Namely, a fixed degree of privacy protection is imposed on all anonymized data released by the data holder. This drawback seriously limits the applicability of random perturbation in scenarios where the holder has numerous recipients to which different privacy levels apply.
INTRODUCTION
Privacy preserving data mining (PPDM) has received considerable attention from the database community in recent years. Given a dataset D, the objective of PPDM is to discover interesting patterns in D (such as various statistics, decision trees, association rules, and so on) without deriving any private data. Input perturbation (IP) [3, 4, 11, 12, 18, 19, 21, 26, 28 ] is a well-adopted methodology to achieve this goal. Generally speaking, IP converts D to another dataset D * that permits effective knowledge learning of D,
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Random perturbation [3, 4, 31] is a simple yet effective IP method that provides rigorous privacy guarantees. In this paper, we focus on a specific random perturbation technique [31] , which we refer to as uniform perturbation. Given a retention probability p, uniform perturbation computes D * from D as follows. First, D * preserves all the non-sensitive values in D. For each sensitive value x, we toss a coin with head probability p. If the coin heads, x is retained in D * . Otherwise (the coin tails), we replace x with a random value in its domain. The value of p controls the tradeoff between the effectiveness of data mining, and the strength of privacy protection. When p equals 1, D * is exactly D, thus maximizing the accuracy of mining, although all private information is revealed. On the other extreme of p = 0, all the sensitive values in D * are completely randomized. In this case, privacy is fully protected, but the precision of mining is the lowest.
Perturbation at multiple privacy levels
All the previous studies (with some exceptions that are vulnerable in privacy protection; see Section 2) on IP methods focus on perturbation at a single privacy level, namely, the anonymized data released to all recipients provides the same degree of privacy protection. The motivation of this work is that, in practice, it is often necessary to release numerous versions with different privacy levels. This is typical when the data holder has recipients that are not equally trustable. For example, it is reasonable to give a less perturbed version to a government agency, and a heavily perturbed version to an unknown organization. Unfortunately, the existing techniques allow us to prepare only one version that either fails to meet the precision requirement of the government agency, or leaks more information than we should to the unknown organization.
Multi-level perturbation is even compulsory if the data holder wants to make profits by charging a cost according to the requested privacy level. This makes sense because various data mining tasks have different precision requirements. For instance, estimating the population of pneumonia patients obviously demands more accurate data than estimating the population of patients having respiratory problems in general. Hence, a recipient is well motivated to pay the minimum cost in exchange of the precision level that just meets her/his needs.
A naive solution to multi-level perturbation is to compute each perturbed version independently. The problem, however, is that Alice Bob retained with probability retained with probability this approach fails when two (or more) recipients share their data. To explain, suppose that we employ uniform perturbation to publish data to two recipients Alice and Bob, for whom the retention probability is 40% and 20%, respectively. Let us assume a simple case where D has a single (sensitive) value HIV, and the disease domain has 1,000 distinct values. Figure 1 shows a possible outcome of independent perturbation, where HIV is retained for both Alice and Bob. Note that, without sharing their data, both Alice and Bob have low confidence in believing the real value is HIV. Specifically, to Alice (Bob), the HIV value she (he) receives may have been a random value with 60% (80%) probability. However, once they share their data, they will realize that their received values are unlikely to be random. This is because the chance for both independently perturbed values to be HIV is small (it is less than 1%
2 ). Consequently, they will have much higher confidence in believing the original value is HIV. The problem becomes much more severe and complicated when more than two recipients are involved.
Contributions
We present the first algorithms of multi-level uniform perturbation that are theoretically robust even under the collusion of recipients. Specifically, our algorithms achieve two crucial properties.
1. By sharing data, recipients gain nothing more than having only the data of the most trustable recipient whose retention probability is the highest (among all the recipients participating in the sharing). For example, in Figure 1 , we ensure that Alice and Bob learn nothing more than Alice herself (without sharing). The above property holds regardless of the number of sharing recipients.
2. Each recipient's data can be used in the same way as if it was computed via ordinary uniform perturbation. This is important because effective algorithms have been developed to use the output of uniform perturbation to perform analytical tasks such as frequent itemset mining [4, 11, 12] , classification by decision trees [8, 29] , counting [3] , etc. Every recipient, therefore, is able to apply those algorithms directly.
In addition to their solid theoretical foundation, the proposed algorithms are both space economical and computationally efficient. Specifically, let n be the cardinality of the underlying dataset D, and m the number of recipients so far. Our algorithms store information that consumes totally O(n + m) expected space, and produces a new perturbed version in O(n + log m) expected time. For large datasets, n is by far greater than m, in which case the expected space and time complexities are both O(n). This is optimal, noticing that D itself already occupies Ω(n) space, and writing n records incurs Ω(n) time. Our technique is incremental, because it does not assume that the privacy levels of future releases are known in advance. Instead, a new request can arrive at any time, at any 2 It may be deceivingly obvious that this probability ought to be 48%. It is not, because the size of the disease domain plays a crucial role in calculating the probability. The formulae for correct calculation will be given later. privacy level, no matter how many requests have been handled previously.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the previous approaches that adopt the IP methodology. Section 3 elaborates the details of uniform perturbation, and its privacy guarantees. Section 4 formally defines the problem of multi-level uniform perturbation. Section 5 gives the details of the proposed algorithm, and analyzes its theoretical properties. Section 6 explains how to implement the algorithm with the minimum space and computational cost. Section 7 evaluates our technique with extensive experiments. Finally, Section 8 concludes the paper with a summary of our results.
RELATED WORK
In this section, we discuss the existing input perturbation (IP) approaches, which can be divided into two categories: partitionbased and randomization-based.
Partition-based Approaches. Given a dataset D, a partition-based approach works by first dividing tuples of D into disjoint groups, and then releasing some general information of each group. There have been a plethora of studies on partition-based approaches, such as generalization [28] , anatomy [33, 35] , condensation [1] . Despite the popularity of these approaches, they are vulnerable to various types of privacy attacks, as pointed out in [16, 26, 32] .
With the exceptions of [7, 17, 30, 34] , all the existing partitionbased approaches consider only one-time publication (i.e., only one anonymized version is released); hence, they cannot be applied to multi-level perturbation. The solutions of [7, 17, 30, 34] , on the other hand, cannot tackle our problem either. Specifically, [17, 30] focus on anonymizing marginals (a marginal is a projection of the dataset on a subset of its attributes), while [7, 34] deal with dynamic anonymization, i.e., how to anonymize a dataset in the presence of updates. The meanings of "re-publication" in the above approaches are all different from our work. They still assume a single, universal, privacy level for all the releases, while we allow the publisher to freely choose the amount of anonymization on each release.
PRELIMINARIES
Random perturbation is type of randomization-based approach that converts a dataset D to its anonymized version D * by (i) copying the non-sensitive values of D to D * , and (ii) substituting each sensitive value x of D with a value sampled from a replacement distribution. Depending on the choice of replacement distribution, there exist several variations of random perturbation [3, 4, 14, 31] . In this paper, we focus on uniform perturbation [31] because, as shown in [4] , it is stronger in privacy protection than other variations.
As explained in Section 1, uniform perturbation processes each sensitive value x of D by tossing a coin with head probability p, where p is a parameter called retention probability. If the coin heads, x is retained in D * ; otherwise, it is replaced with a random value in its domain. Algorithm uni-pert in Figure 2 summarizes the perturbation process.
More formally, the replacement distribution of uniform perturbation is defined as follows. Let X be a random variable denoting the original value, and Y a random variable denoting the output of perturbation. Both X and Y distribute in a domain DOM with size s. Then, the probability of perturbing a value x ∈ DOM to y ∈ DOM is given by:
Let us explain the equation by focusing on the case x = y, namely, the original value X equals the perturbed value Y (the other case x = y is simpler and can be understood similarly). This happens under either of the following disjoint events: (i) X is retained directly, or (ii) X is replaced by a random value from DOM , and this value happens to be x. Event (i) occurs with probability p (the retention probability). The probability of event (ii) equals
is the probability that we decide not to retain X, and 1/s the probability that x is picked randomly from a domain of size s. Hence, the chance that at least one event happens is p + (1 − p)/s. Privacy guarantees. Uniform perturbation can ensure several different types of privacy guarantees, such as ρ1-ρ2 privacy [11] and δ-growth [29] . Specifically, both ρ1-ρ2 privacy and δ-growth impose constraints on adversaries' prior and posterior beliefs about any sensitive value X in the input data. Let Q(X) be any predicate on X, Y be an anonymized version of X, and P r[Q(X)]
Algorithm uni-pert (x, p) /* x is the value being perturbed, and p the retention probability */ 1. toss a coin with head probability p 2. if the coin heads then return x 3. else return a random value in the domain of x Figure 2 : Algorithm of uniform perturbation where ρ1 and ρ2 are two constants in (0, 1] such that ρ1 < ρ2. On the other hand, δ-growth ensures that
In Section 5, we will present a multi-level perturbation algorithm that achieves both ρ1-ρ2 privacy and δ-growth.
It is noteworthy that, uniform perturbation tends to provide a weaker degree of privacy protection, when there exist correlations among the sensitive values that are known to the adversary [26] . This issue is not specific to uniform perturbation: as pointed out in [25] , most existing input perturbation methodologies consider adversaries with no prior knowledge of tuple correlations. In fact, it has been proved in [26] that, if an adversary knows arbitrary correlations among the tuples in D, then no input perturbation algorithm can produce useful anonymized data without enabling the adversary to learn significant information about a predicate Q(X) of some sensitive value X in D. A complete treatment of tuple correlations is beyond the scope of our work.
PROBLEM DEFINITION
We assume that the dataset D has a sensitive attribute A with domain DOM , and a set B of non-sensitive attributes. All the tuples of D are considered to have been independently drawn from an identical distribution. Our solutions are applicable, even if there are multiple sensitive attributes A1, A2, ..., Az. In that case, we can simply view all of them as a single attribute with domain A1 × A2 × ... × Az, and then, apply the proposed technique in exactly the same way. A similar approach has also been adopted in [26] .
We aim at enabling the holder of D to satisfy an infinite number of requests for an anonymized version of D. Each request is associated with a retention probability p. This value represents the trustability level of the data recipient. That is, the recipient is more (less) trustable if her/his p is higher (lower). The holder must send to the recipient a dataset D * that can be regarded as the output of uniform perturbation with retention probability p.
Different recipients may collude by sharing their (anonymized) data, in an attempt to infer the original dataset D to a precision beyond their trustability levels. The best way to discourage collusion is to make sure that it will be useless. Notice that, the sharing recipients will obviously glean at least the same knowledge as the most trustable recipient among them. Thus, the best the holder can do is to ensure that nothing more can be derived. Next, we formulate this requirement mathematically.
It suffices to enforce the requirement on individual tuples, because both uniform perturbation and our algorithms anonymize the The i-th highest retention
The perturbed version of D returned to the (1 ≤ i ≤ m) recipient with retention probability p i p
The retention probability of the incoming request Table 2 : Frequently used symbols tuples of D independently. Let t be an arbitrary tuple in D. Consider a set S share of recipients that are colluding to evaluate the chance that the sensitive value X of t satisfies a predicate Q(X). Each recipient has a perturbed copy of X derived using her/his retention probability. Denote by L the set of those perturbed values, among which let best(L) be the one contributed by the most trustable recipient in S share . We will guarantee
where P r[Q(X)|L] is the confidence that the recipients of S share can derive on conjecture Q(X) by putting their data together, and
P r[Q(X)|best(L)] is their confidence by looking at only best(L) itself. Equation 2, therefore, ensures that collusion yields nothing more about Q(x)
than what the most trustable recipient in S share can already tell alone. In other words, any ρ1-ρ2 privacy or δ-growth requirement (as discussed in Section 3) we impose on the most trustable recipient still holds under collusion. Now we are ready to formally define the problem of multi-level uniform perturbation. Note that it is trivial to handle the first request, because we can simply return the output of conventional uniform perturbation. The problem kicks in at the second request. In general, let H be the set of all recipients we have already responded to in history, and |H| ≥ 1. Now, given a new request with retention probability p, we aim at returning a dataset D * where every tuple t * corresponds to a tuple t ∈ D such that
• t * keeps all the non-sensitive values of t.
• Let X (Y ) be the sensitive value t (t * ). The distribution of Y is given in Equation 1, namely, same as uniform perturbation with retention probability p.
• Equation 2 holds for any non-empty subset L of all the perturbed values of t we returned (including the one to the current recipient).
We do not put any constraint on the sequence of recipients, namely, their requests can arrive in any order of their retention probabilities. Furthermore, we deal with the online setting where the retention probabilities of future requests are unknown in advance. In analyzing the space and time complexities, we assume that all retention probabilities are at least a small constant c > 0. This is reasonable because, in practice, it does not make sense to perform perturbation with an excessively low retention probability. In that case, most sensitive data will be replaced by random values, rendering it impossible to carry out meaningful data mining. In practice, a good choice of c can be 0.001. Table 2 lists the symbols that will be used frequently.
MULTI-LEVEL UNIFORM PERTURBA-TION
Following the notations in Section 4, denote by H the set of recipients we have responded to previously. Let m be the size of H. Recall that each recipient is associated with a retention probability. Denote by p1, p2, ..., pm the retention probabilities associated with the recipients in H, sorted in non-ascending order, namely, p1
be the anonymized version of D returned to the recipient with retention probability pi.
The goal of this section is to design an algorithm for computing a new version D * for an incoming request with retention probability p. We consider that p is not equivalent to any of p1, p2, ..., pm. Otherwise, assume p = pi for some i ∈ [1, m] ; it suffices to return D * i . Apparently, in this case, it is not necessary to add the recipient to H. Hence, in the sequel, we consider that all p1, p2, ..., pm are mutually different. Section 5.1 first presents the details of our algorithm, and then, Section 5.2 analyzes its theoretical properties.
Algorithm
(as explained in Section 1.1, independent perturbation may lead to severe privacy breach under collusion). It turns out that, as proved in the next subsection, the correct way to calculate D * requires at most only two tables from {D *
be the smallest probability in {p1, p2, ..., pm} that is larger than p, and similarly, pr (1 ≤ r ≤ m) be the largest probability in the same set that is smaller than p. Then, the two tables needed are D * l and D * r . There are two special cases that must be clarified. First, p may be greater than all the retention probabilities received previously, and hence, p l does not exist. In this case, we define p l = 1, and D * l to be the original dataset D. Second, p may be smaller than all the previous retention probabilities, and hence, pr does not exist. In this case, we leave pr and D * r undefined. Our algorithm behaves differently depending on whether pr exists. Next, we elaborate the details, concentrating on the sensitive values because all the non-sensitive values are directly kept.
• 
where s is the size of DOM . If the coin heads (tails), Y equals y l (yr). Otherwise (the coin stands), it is a random value in DOM . 
Figure 3: Algorithm of multi-level uniform perturbation
Algorithm multi-pert in Figure 3 formally summarizes the above procedures. Next, we will illustrate the intuition behind the algorithm using two examples.
Example 1.
Assume that the original dataset D has only a single (sensitive) value x = HIV. Alice issues the first data request with retention probability 40%, which is handled by conventional uniform perturbation. Suppose that HIV is retained, and sent to Alice. So, at this moment, H includes only Alice, and p1 = 40%. Now, Bob issues the second request with retention probability p = 20%. As p is smaller than every previous retention probability, pr does not exist. On the other hand, p l = 40%, and we will compute the value Y sent to Bob based on only the value HIV sent to Alice. Specifically, we do so by tossing a coin with head probability p/p l = 50%. Y equals HIV if the coin heads, or otherwise a random value from the disease domain DOM .
To verify the correctness of the above strategy, we need to show that (i) Y follows the same distribution as the output of uniform perturbation, namely, using algorithm uni-pert in Figure 2 to perturb HIV with retention probability p = 20%, and (ii) the collusion between Alice and Bob tells no more than what Alice already knows by herself. In fact, fact (ii) is obvious, because Bob's value is computed solely from Alice's value, and therefore, hints no more than what Alice's value already hints. Next, we will explain fact (i).
Let us discuss the probability of Y = HIV, assuming that the disease domain DOM has size s = 10. By our algorithm, Y equals HIV under each of the following disjoint events:
I. Alice receives HIV, and the coin we toss for Bob heads.
II. Alice receives HIV, the coin we toss for Bob tails, and the random value we draw from DOM happens to be HIV.
III. Alice does not receive HIV, the coin we toss for Bob tails, and the random value we draw from DOM happens to be HIV.
Since Alice's value is output by uni-pert with retention probability 40%, by Equation 1, she gets the value HIV with probability 0.4 + (1 − 0.4)/10 = 0.46. As a result, Event I occurs with probability 0.46 × 0.5 = 0.23 (recall that the coin tossed for Bob has head probability 50%). Event II has probability 0.46 × 0.5 × (1/10) = 0.023, and Event III probability (1−0.46)×0.5×(1/10) = 0.027. Therefore, overall Y has probability 0.23 + 0.023 + 0.027 = 0.28 to be HIV. On the other hand, given retention probability p = 20%, algorithm uni-pert also has probability 0.2 + (1 − 0.2)/10 = 0.28 (Equation 1) to perturb value HIV to itself. In a similar fashion, it is not hard to verify that Y has the same probability to take any value as the output of uni-pert. This establishes the correctness of fact (i).
Example 2. Let us consider another scenario where everything remains the same with the first recipient Alice, but the second recipient Bob has retention probability p = 80%. In this case, both p l and pr exist, and equal 1 and 40%, respectively. Accordingly, we will calculate Y (the value for Bob) using two values: the original value y l in D, and the value yr Alice received. Here, yr happens to coincide with y l = HIV.
Assuming that DOM has size s = 10, we calculate the values of u and v using Equations 3 and 4, obtaining u = 80% and v = 17.8%. Thus, we throw a coin that heads with probability 80%, tails with probability 17.8%, or stands with probability 2.2%. Y is set to y l if the coin heads, to yr if it tails, or drawn randomly from DOM otherwise. As y l = yr = HIV, it follows that that Y also equals HIV with 97.8% chance, or a random value with 2.2% probability.
Next, we give the rationale behind the derivation of u and v in Equations 3 and 4 (see Section 5.2 for a rigorous proof). Recall that u (v) is the head (tail) probability of the coin we toss for Bob. For each probability, we need to decide two values for the case y l = yr and y l = yr, respectively. Let u1 (u2) be the head probability under y l = yr (y l = yr), similarly, v1 and v2 for tail. Our goal is to find equations from which we can solve u1, u2, v1, and v2 precisely.
Let random variable X denote the original value in D, and random variable Ya (Y b ) denote the value Alice (Bob) receives. Remember that Alice and Bob have retention probabilities pa = 40% and p b = 80%, respectively. Our algorithm must ensure two goals. First, collusion is useless, namely, 
It turns out that (as shown in the proof of Lemma 1) Equations 5 and 6 both hold when
Four equations can be established based on the first four cases of the above equation set (the last case is redundant as the probabilities of all five cases must sum up to 1). We will explain only the equation arising from the case ya = y b = x because the other equations can be formulated similarly. Notice that ya = x is exactly the scenario we demonstrated earlier, where the value of Alice is identical to the original value in D (i.e., y l = yr). In this case, our algorithm gives Bob the same value (i.e., Y = y l = yr) under either of the following disjoint events:
I. The coin we toss for Bob heads or tails.
II. The coin stands, and the random value we draw from DOM happens to be x.
Event I occurs with probability u1 + v1, whereas Event II happens with probability (1 − u1 − v1)/s. Hence, the resulting equation is:
Theoretical analysis
In this subsection, we will formally prove the correctness of our algorithm by establishing two properties. First, collusion is useless. Second, the anonymized version every recipient obtains can be regarded as the output of conventional uniform perturbation.
As the tuples of the original dataset D are anonymized independently, it suffices to focus on one individual tuple t ∈ D. Let random variable X denote the sensitive value of t. Recall that p1, p2, ..., pm are the retention probabilities of the recipients in H, sorted in descending order.
is the anonymized version we sent to the recipient with retention probability pi. Let random variables Y1, Y2, ..., Ym denote the perturbed versions of
Let L be any non-empty subset of {Y1 = y1, Y2 = y2, ..., Ym = ym}, where Yi = yi represents the observation that the recipient with retention probability pi obtains a concrete value yi ∈ DOM . As mentioned in Section 4, proving the futility of collusion is equivalent to verifying the validity of Equation 2 for any L. On the other hand, to convince the recipient with retention probability pi (1 ≤ i ≤ m) that the Yi s/he obtains can be regarded as the outcome of uniform perturbation, we must show that Yi is statistically the same as the output of uni-pert (Figure 2 ), namely:
for any x, y1, y2, ..., ym in DOM . For notational convenience, let p0 = 1 and Y0 = X. We first present a key lemma that is useful in the subsequent analysis.
LEMMA 1. For any i ∈ [1, m], we have
and
for any y0, y1, ..., ym in DOM .
PROOF. See Appendix 1.
Intuitively, Equation 9 means that, among X, Y1, Y2, ..., Yi−1, it is the last value Yi−1 that has the greatest impact on Yi. In fact, the impact is so heavy that even Yi−1 itself is already sufficient for analyzing Yi. Furthermore, Equation 10 tells us another interesting fact: Yi can actually be regarded as the output of uni-pert when the original value is Yi−1, and the retention probability is pi/pi−1! Now, we are ready to show that collusion is useless.
THEOREM 1. Equation 2 holds for any
PROOF. It suffices to show that the equation is correct when Q(X) takes the form X = x for any x ∈ DOM . Let us introduce I as: We are interested in only those events where z k is fixed to y k , as long as k belongs to I. In other words, if Y k is defined for a colluding recipient, we always instantiate it to the value y k received by that recipient. Definē
which is the event
In the sequel, when zi, ..., zj are clear from the context, we simplify Wi,j(zi, ..., zj ) to Wi,j, andLi,j (zi, ..., zj) toLi,j . Equipped with the above definitions, rewrite P r[X = x|L] (i.e., the posterior confidence of the colluding recipients) as
The rest of the proof will show that, regardless of the values of z k (k ∈Ī), it always holds that
Thus, Equation 12
which is exactly the right hand side of Equation 2. It remains to verify Equation 13 . First, from Equation 9, it is not hard to derive
The above equation can be intuitively understood as follows. Equation 9 indicates that, as long as Y b is present, we do not need X in analyzing Y b+1 . In turn, Yi (b + 1 ≤ i ≤ w − 1) allows us to analyze Yi+1. Hence, the chain effect is that, given Y b , X is not needed in calculating the chance of event W b+1,w . Therefore,
validating Equation 13 . Equation 9 indicates
Hence, 
thus completing the proof.
Remark. It is worth mentioning that, although in this paper we focus on uniform perturbation, the idea behind multi-pert can also be applied to convert some other methods, which currently support only a single level of privacy, to variations that can support multilevel privacy. Examples include perturbation with non-uniform replacement distributions [3] , noise adding methods [2, 20] , and so on. Note, however, it does not imply that those variations are able to secure as strong privacy as the techniques proposed in this paper. As mention earlier, for instance, uniformity in general outperforms other replacement distributions in privacy preservation [4] , whereas adding Gaussian noise is known to be defective [15] .
MINIMIZING SPACE AND TIME
In this section, we discuss how to implement the algorithm multipert in Figure 3 efficiently. As before, let H be the set of recipients we have responded to in history, and m = |H|. Let p1, p2, ..., pm be the retention probabilities of the recipients in H, sorted in descending order. Denote by D * i (1 ≤ i ≤ m) the anonymized version of the original dataset D we returned to the recipient with retention probability pi. As mentioned in Section 4, we consider that all p1, p2, ..., pm are at least a small constant c > 0.
Recall that, given a new request with retention probability p, + log m) .
Obviously, since we never change any non-sensitive value, the non-sensitive values in the original dataset D need to be stored only once, regardless of the number of recipients. In the sequel, we will concentrate on compressing sensitive values. Furthermore, as tuples are anonymized independently, it suffices to clarify the compression for a single tuple. 
Vi.
The expected value E[Vi]
of Vi equals the probability P r[Yi = Yi+1] that Yi and Yi+1 are not identical. In turn, this probability can represented as:
where DOM is the domain of Yi and Yi+1.
Equation 10 implies that
where s is the domain of DOM . Therefore,
From the above analysis, we know
Under the constraint that
The right hand side of the above inequality increases monotonically with m. Furthermore,
Thus, we arrive at E[disp(t)] < ln(1/c).
Note that ln(1/c) is very small. For example, as mentioned in Section 4, in practice a reasonable value for c would be 0.001. In that case, ln(1/c) < 7, namely, on average a tuple has less than 7 disparate pairs regardless of the number m of recipients.
We are ready to explain how to store Y1, Y2, ..., Ym compactly. In fact, it suffices to build a simple list history(t), where elements have the form p, Y . First, put p1, Y1 in history(t). Then, for every disparate consecutive pair (Yi, Yi+1) (1 ≤ i ≤ m − 1), add an element pi+1, Yi+1 to history(t). By Lemma 2, history(t) occupies O(1) space in expectation.
Given any retention probability pi (1 ≤ i ≤ m), history(t) allows us to retrieve the corresponding Yi in O(1) expected time, even if pi is not captured by history(t). For this purpose, we find the smallest probability in history(t) that is at least pi, and return the perturbed value associated with that probability. As an example, assume m = 5, and Y1 = Y2 = HIV, Y3 = Y4 = pneumonia, Y5 = HIV. Thus, history(t) consists of p1, Y1 , p3, Y3 , and p5, Y5 . To obtain the perturbed value corresponding to p2, first identify p1, which is the lowest probability in history(t) at least p2 (recall that p1, p2, ..., p5 are in descending order). Hence, the answer is the value Y1 associated with p1.
Optimal implementation of multi-pert. We need to keep the m retention probabilities of all recipients in H. For large datasets, the cardinality n is by far greater than the number m of recipients. In this case, both the expected space and computation complexities are O(n) which is optimal.
EXPERIMENTS
This section presents an experimental study of the proposed technique. First, we will verify that our algorithm works fairly well in practice with a pseudo-random generator. Second, we will demonstrate the failure of independent perturbation, thus confirming the motivation in Section 1.1. Finally, we will evaluate the space and computation overhead of our solution. All experiments are performed on a computer with a 4GHz Pentium IV CPU and 2GB memory.
Usefulness of collusion. In Section 5.2, we have rigorously proved that our algorithm multi-pert (Figure 3 ) effectively thwarts collusion. Implicit in the proof is an assumption that we can generate a sequence of numbers that are truly random. As in practice random generation can only be simulated by a pseudo-random generator (such as the Mersenne twister algorithm [23] used in our implementation), a natural question is whether multi-pert is still effective in that case.
To answer the question, we consider a scenario where the data holder must respond to recipients Alice, Bob, and Charlie (in this order) with retention probabilities pa = 30%, p b = 10%, and pc = 50%, respectively. Note that the ordering ensures that all cases of multi-pert (as explained in Section 5.1) will be executed. Let random variable X denote an original sensitive value, in a discrete domain DOM with size s. Let random variables Ya, Y b , and Yc describe the perturbed values sent to Alice, Bob, and Charlie, respectively. If their collusion is useless, equation
must hold for arbitrary x, ya, y b , and yc in DOM . Remember that the theoretical correctness of Equation 14 has been formally established in Theorem 1. Nevertheless, since our purpose here is practical verification, we must empirically calculate both sides, and then check if they are identical. Next, we explain a statistical approach to achieve this.
We start by choosing a probability density function pdf (x) of X, and preparing a 4D array 
We examine 4 different choices of pdf (x). The first two are synthetic distributions: uniform and Gaussian, both in a domain DOM of size s = 50, as shown in Figures 4a and 4b respectively. The other two distributions are taken from a real dataset Adult that is commonly used in the literature of privacy preservation. This dataset is the product of the Minnesota Population Center (http://ipums.org), and contains the information of 600k Americans on 5 attributes: Age, Gender, Education, Occupation, and Salary. Figure 4c (4d) demonstrates the distribution of Salary (Occupation), whose domain size is 50 (27) . Both distributions are respectively selected as the underlying pdf (x).
As it is infeasible to visualize a 4D array directly, we instead aim at presenting the cases where the two sides of Equation 14 differ most. First, notice that if we fix ya, y b , and yc but enumerate x through the entire domain DOM , the left hand side of Equation 14 is in fact a distribution fy a,yb,yc (x), which corresponds to the re- cipients' knowledge about X after collusion. Similarly, the right hand side is also a distribution fy c (x), which represents the knowledge of Charlie before collusion. Ideally, fy a,yb,yc (x) should be identical to fy c (x) for all x ∈ DOM , but discrepancy can arise due to pseudo-randomness, precision loss in float calculation, insufficient simulations, etc. We can quantify the dissimilarity of the two distributions using the standard L2 norm:
Among all the combinations of ya, y b , yc, Figure 5a presents the pair of distributions fy a,yb,yc (x) and fy c (x) that are most dissimilar, when pdf (x) is uniform (specifically, the largest dissimilarity is observed at ya = 26, y b = 15, yc = 16). Figures 5b, 5c, 5d give the corresponding results when pdf (x) follows the Gaussian, Salary, and Occupation distributions (see Figure 4) , respectively. Clearly, in all cases, both sides of Equation 14 agree with each other very well, indicating that the proposed algorithm multi-pert has successfully prevented collusion.
Noteworthily, the fact that there appears a standing-out column in all the distributions in Figure 4 , is an intrinsic property of uniform perturbation (which our technique is identical to, as empirically verified shortly) -the perturbed value (in our case, that received by Charlie) always has the highest chance in the reconstructed distribution, even when the value is not equivalent to the original one.
Equivalence to uniform perturbation. Besides anti-collusion, multi-pert needs to to make sure that every anonymized version can be regarded as the output of conventional uniform perturbation. In the context of the previous experiments, it implies that equation
must hold for any i ∈ {a, b, c}, and any values of x and yi in DOM . Theorem 2 has proved the equation in theory. Next, we provide empirical evidence of its correctness in practice. We follow a strategy similar to Figure 5 . Specifically, given i = a (the cases of i = b and c are similar), P r[Ya = ya|X = x] can be approximated as
where F is the array produced by the simulations described earlier.
By fixing x and enumerating yi in DOM , the left hand side of Equation 16 can be regarded as a distribution fx(yi) of Yi. Given the theoretical values on the right hand side of Equation 16 , the error of fx(yi) can again be quantified by the L2 norm: Failure of independent perturbation. The remaining experiments will use all the attributes of the Adult dataset, treating Salary as the only sensitive attribute. In Section 1.1, we argue that independent perturbation may lead to severe privacy breach. The next experiment will validate the argument. Specifically, we will show that, when the number m of recipients is large, their collusion may reconstruct the whole dataset with high probability. We generate all retention probabilities uniformly in the range [0.001, 0.5]. For each tuple of Adult, define its reconstruction probability as the chance that the collusion of all m recipients successfully restores its actual sensitive value (see Appendix 2 for how to derive this probability). We continuously monitor the average reconstruction probability of all tuples as m increases. Figure 7 shows the results of independent perturbation and our algorithm multi-pert. Independent perturbation is clearly a vulnerable approach, noticing that its average reconstruction probability quickly surges to nearly 1 after only 30 releases, implying that at this time almost all the tuples are precisely revealed. In contrast, multi-pert is much more robust, by retaining an average reconstruction probability of around 30%. Multi-pert stores all the non-sensitive values only once. Hence, compared to the original dataset, the extra space overhead is determined by how many (perturbed) sensitive values we must keep for each tuple t, namely, the size of its structure history(t) (see its definition in Section 6). Figure 8a plots the average size of history(t) as a function of m. As predicted by Lemma 2, the size history(t) is bounded by a constant (here, 7) for all arrival orders. In fact, by slightly modifying the proof of Lemma 2, we can tighten the upper bound to 1 + ln(pmax/pmin), where pmax (pmin) is the highest (lowest) retention probability seen so far. This explains why random (descending) demands the most (least) space for small m, noticing that it causes the fastest (slowest) growth of pmax/pmin.
The last experiment inspects the computational efficiency of multi-pert. As the whole dataset is small (around 10 mega bytes), we load everything into memory, and measure the CPU time. Figure 8b demonstrates the performance as m increases. Evidently, the algorithm is very efficient. It computes an anonymized dataset in less than half a second in all cases.
CONCLUSIONS
Random perturbation is a classic data anonymization technique that has significant importance in practice. It is easy to apply, ensures strong privacy protection, and enables effective data mining. Unfortunately, all the existing studies are restricted to perturbation at a single privacy level. This is a serious problem, because a data holder often needs to perform anonymization for multiple recipients that are not equally trustable, and hence, should be assigned different privacy levels. In this paper, we have settled the problem with a novel algorithm for randomly perturbing a dataset at an infinite number of privacy levels. Our solution is robust even when recipients attempt to infer extra sensitive information by sharing their data together. Furthermore, the algorithm works in the online setting where the privacy levels of future data requests are unknown in advance, and can arrive at an arbitrary order. Finally, in addition to its rigorous and strong privacy guarantees, the proposed technique is also highly efficient, as its expected space and time complexities are asymptotically optimal.
Appendix 1. Proof of Lemma 1
We prove the lemma by induction on m. For m = 1, there is only one possible choice for i (i.e., 1), in which case the lemma is vacuously true. Assuming the lemma's correctness for all m ≤ k, next we show that it also holds for m = k + 1.
Assume, without loss of generality, that the last, (k + 1)-st, request has retention probability pj (recall that the past retention probabilities p1, p2, ..., pm+1 have been sorted in descending order). The proof is simple if j = k + 1. Specifically, in this scenario, Yj is computed only from Y k . In other words, Yj is not related to Y0, Y1, ..., Y k−1 , and hence, Equation 9 is correct. Furthermore, our algorithm multi-pert (Figure 3 ) sets Yj to Y k with probability p k /pj , or to a random value from DOM with probability 1 − p k /pj. Therefore, Equation 10 is also correct. 
We now show P r[Yj+1 = yj+1|Yj = yj ] has the same expression as in Equation 22 , which will validate both Equations 9 and 
Appendix 2. Reconstruction probability
We borrow the notations D, t, m, pi (1 ≤ i ≤ m), X, Yi, yi defined in Section 5.2. The reconstruction probability of t equals:
namely, the probability that the collusion of all m recipients reveals the actual sensitive value .
